ABSTRACT To reduce the risks of malicious software, malware detection methods using machine learning have received tremendous attention in recent years. Most of the conventional methods are based on supervised learning, which relies on static features with definite labels. However, recent studies have shown the models based on supervised learning are vulnerable to deliberate attacks. This work tends to expose and demonstrate the weakness in these models. A DQEAF framework using reinforcement learning to evade anti-malware engines is presented. DQEAF trains an AI agent through a neural network by constantly interacting with malware samples. Actions are a set of reasonable modifications, which do not damage samples' structure and functions. The agent selects the optimal sequence of actions to modify the malware samples, thus they can bypass the detection engines. The training process depends on the characteristics of the raw binary stream features of samples. The experiments show that the proposed method has a success rate of 75%. The efficacy of the proposed DQEAF has also been evaluated by other families of malicious software, which shows good robustness.
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the massive exchange of messages on the network, variety of malware and their variants appear explosively [1] . New malicious software have the characteristics of rapid growth, powerful survivability, and strong anti reconnaissance [2] , which make many security-sensitive applications more vulnerable to be attacked. To tackle this problem, various malware detection methods have been developed, which depend on signature [39] , the sequence of program API calls [14] , supervised machine learning [4] , and so on.
Owing to the hardware advancement [3] , machine learning plays a critical role in extracting meaningful information out of the huge amount of data and therefore vast of detection methods depend on that to discover unknown malware families and variations [7] . Most state-of-the-art classifiers used today are based on supervised learning, which are trained on dataset with labels to classify the given software.
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However, the robustness of these methods is not certain [28] , [29] , especially methods using supervised learning, which tends to extract static features and statistical characteristics, instead of doing dynamic or in-depth analysis. That may make supervised learning vulnerable to be attacked [20] or evaded.
As many malware detection methods rely on machine learning for automated decisions, several attacks have emerged on using potential vulnerabilities introduced by supervised learning algorithms to evade detections [8] . Sophisticated attackers have strong incentives to manipulate the results and models generated by supervised learning algorithms to achieve their objectives [19] . For instance, attackers can deliberately influence the training dataset to manipulate the results of a predictive model [9] (in poisoning attacks [10] - [12] ), causing misclassification of new data in the testing phase [13] (in evasion attacks [21] - [23] ). Potential adversaries can also modify the samples, while preserving malicious behaviors, to evade the detection. For example, genetic programming can be used to make evasive variants [31] and reinforcement learning can offer a sequence of actions to modify the samples to obfuscate detection [7] . These circumvention technology will cause serious consequences, including failure of the detection tools and risks to security of system and network.
The aforementioned references illustrate that classifiers using supervised learning may fail under certain scenarios. Thus, the malware detection based on supervised learning could lose defense when encountering complicated and powerful attackers. Our work aims to expose the weaknesses in their architectures by modifying the malicious samples and making them evade the detection without knowledge of the classifier. The result can be used to improve the efficacy of classifiers. Besides, due to the variety of formats and huge number of malware, our work focuses on PE file to prove the lack of robustness in the detection method using supervised learning.
A general framework using deep Q-network to evade antimalware engines (DQEAF) is proposed in this work. A specific attacking model is established, and an AI agent is set up to confront the malware detector. The agent firstly inspects malware samples, and then selects a sequence of functionality-preserving actions deliberately to modify the samples. For any given malware sample, the framework can eventually determine the optimal sequence of actions to evade the supervised-learning-based detector. The newly modified sample may not be easily detected by the antimalware engine. In the study, the static Windows portable executable (PE) malicious softwares are used as the training samples to validate the proposed DQEAF. Results show that 75% success rate of evasion on samples can be achieved. For extraction of features from the PE malicious files, raw binary byte stream is used. As the features are irrelevant to file structure, the proposed method can be extended to other platforms such as ELF, Android, etc.
The proposed DQEAF has the following characteristics:
• Fewer functionality-preserving actions (only 4 actions);
• Low-dimensional raw binary stream features to observe samples (only 513 dimensions);
• High evasion success rate; The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II discusses the related work. Section III describes the proposed DQEAF in details. Section IV presents the experimental setup and numerical simulation results. Section V concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
There are several attempts to bypass or directly attack the machine-learning-based malware classifiers to achieve the purpose of confrontation. At present, machine learning technology is widely used in human-machine interaction [40] , recommender systems [15] , security protection [16] and other fields [17] , [18] . However, models based on machine learning are always fronted with deliberate attacks. According to attacker's understanding of target classifier, methods can be divided into two cases:
A. WHITE BOX ATTACK Adversaries can interact with detection systems in the process of generating adversarial attack data, for the algorithm used by the malware classifiers and the parameters used by the algorithm are available. Most of the previously reported successful attacks assume that the attacker has full knowledge of the learned model. It can, therefore, be argued that reducing the amount of knowledge leaked about the model, as well as a proactive response to potential exploitation of such knowledge would provide adequate protection against adversarial data manipulation. Šrndić and Laskov [22] performed on a real learning-based system, PDFrate, for detection of PDF malware. They defined an orthogonal set of evasion strategies reflecting various degrees of available knowledge and inserted dummy content into PDF files to confuse the classifier. Their study was limited to evading the initial binary classifier and limited to known detector. Grosse et al. [26] proposed to use the gradient-based approach to generate adversarial Android malware examples evading their own white box classifier. Biggio et al. [27] also presented a gradient-based approach to systematically assess different classification algorithms against evasion attacks. They exhibited different risk levels for the classifier by increasing the attacker's knowledge of the model and samples.
B. BLACK BOX ATTACK
An attacker does not know the algorithms and parameters used by the malware classifiers, but they can still interact with the system, and has the ability to retrieve a Boolean label. Researchers generate adversarial networks and some other methods to evade detection without knowledge of the models [25] . Xu et al. [31] modified malware samples iteratively and tested them against a detection method using genetic programming for guiding this process. In addition, Hu and Tan [30] proposed a model called MalGAN which generates adversarial examples to attack black-box malware detection algorithms. Instead of attacking the black box directly, the attacker creates a substitute model trained to reproduce outputs observed by probing the target model with corresponding inputs. Then, the substitute model is used for gradient computation in a modified GAN to produce evasive malware variants.
Among the black box attacks, Anderson's pioneering works [7] , [34] use deep reinforcement learning to attack the malware engines. Without prior knowledge of the static PE malware classifier's structure, features and parameters, the authors design a series of actions to interact with the malware samples. Their main purpose is to come up with a framework to solve problems in security field using reinforcement learning. There are some comparisons with these pioneering works in Section IV.
This work focuses on the following points and has made some improvements: (1) Each action is guaranteed to be effective on all samples and will not lead to corruption. Thus, the training process would not be interrupted; (2) Low dimensions of the observation is used to reduce the instability raised by high dimensions; (3) Priority is taken into consideration during the replay of the past transitions.
III. METHOD A. PRIMARY CONCEPT
Reinforcement learning is a branch of machine learning where an agent seeks to learn optimal action decision-making by trying to maximize cumulative rewards. The learning process requires interaction between Environment and Agent, as is shown in Figure 1 .
The functions of Environment, which integrate with observation and rewards evaluation, are to provide state (the description of current stage) and reward (action evaluation value) for Agent. Agent is composed of parameters and algorithm to determine the action to take next. So, the input of reinforcement learning is rewards and states of Environment observation. The output is the strategy of action selection in the Agent for a certain problem.
B. MODEL STRUCTURE
Using reinforcement learning to tackle anti-malware evasion problem, appropriate definition of environment, action, reward and agent are necessary. In more details, Figure 2 exhibits the entire architecture of DQEAF. The environment represents a holistic view of the malware samples, which consists of a feature extractor observing the sample state and a black-box malware classifier to judge the samples. The judge result (malware or benign) is used to define the reward as detailed in section III-E. The reward and state are then fed back into the agent.
Then the agent takes the features of the samples and reward with two neural networks to compute action-value Q and target action-valueQ. During training process, networks are updated for global optimization ofQ. Then it can choose one reasonable action based on action choosing policy, which is exerted on the file sample to evaluate for the next turn. After several turns when this malicious sample is classified as a benign one, the training for this sample ends. When all trainings come to an end, the agent achieves optimal parameters of neural networks. Its network value with extracted features as input decides which action to adopt. The action space consists of a set of modifications exerted on the PE malware samples which do not break the format and functions of them. There exists a series of states transitions (s 1 , s 2 , s 3 , . . . , s t ) to an end state under Markov hypothesis. The transition probability of state and the output probability of observation are only dependent on the current state. Due to its dependency, we record
as one piece of transition information in the training, each of which works out a Q with some weights θ to present its correctness in action selection. The intelligent learning in our framework comes from MDP (Markov Decision Process) which consists of 4-tuple, (S, A, γ , R(A, S)).
• S: a set of states (as detailed in section III-C Environment) representing the current composition of the malware sample, offered by the environment and then transferred to agent, of which S t indicates the state at the time of t.
• A: a set of actions (as detail in section III-D Action Space) to alter the sample's structure, of which A t indicates the chosen action at the time of t.
• γ : a discount factor γ ∈ [0, 1] referring to the relative significance of future rewards to the present.
• R(A, S): reward value R a (s, s ) (how to define R will be explained in the section of III-E Reward) offered by the environment after the state transiting from s to s through action a. Transitions will be used in training section III-F as past experience to replay. With several pieces, an action that brings out the maximum reward in the condition of s can be found. That is the final approximate action for state s in Equation (2).
After this maximization process, our chief goal, to obtain the best DQEAF agent which will take the optimal actions to modify a malicious software to evade detection, is achieved. 
C. ENVIRONMENT
In DQEAF, the environment is used to observe the manifestation and composition of PE malware samples. The more comprehensive and reasonable the observation is, the easier the training results may reach the expected rate. Due to the characteristics of reinforcement learning, the pre-process of the samples is not needed.
The environment is defined by the raw binary feature as it can represent a holistic view of the malware samples and it is sensitive to each step of action. We count byte histogram normalized to sum to unity, which is done by counting number of occurrences of each feature value over the entire binary file. Besides, two-dimensional entropy histogram [4] is used to represent the distribution of bytes, which is implemented by sliding a window with constant bytes and computing the base-2 entropy of each window.
D. ACTION SPACE
After the agent observed the state of the environment, it must choose one action from the set of all available actions. Formally the set of all possible actions is defined as A = {ARBE, ARI, ARS, RS}. Therefore, at time t, the agent chooses an action a t . All actions exerted on PE files are shown in Figure 3 . In this paper, the actions are only a few possible choices. Reinforcement learning with extremely large action spaces will increase the difficulty of model training and the time elapse [33] . As for the action space designing, two aspects are taken into consideration.
It is necessary to ensure that the modification of the file is as simple as possible to guarantee the successful modification. Modification process should not result the failure, such as the collapse of malware due to the modification of ''rude action''. These failures will interrupt the training process. According to the training of this work, the simplest actions as follows are chosen. DataDirectory. To begin with, the agent reads the content of original binary PE file, append or remove content at the specified location, and amend the relative virtual address for sample with ensurance of the integrity of the file. Details are in Algorithm 1.
In addition to that, it is necessary to ensure that the original function of the file is not damaged after the actions. The essential thing is that actions will not have any impact on the structure and functions of PE files. Proof of this part is available in the experimental section IV-C. 
Algorithm 1 Section-
The reward is an element that differentiates reinforcement learning from other types of machine learning. How to select the appropriate reward for a given task is an unanswered problem in traditional reinforcement learning. It would be desirable if the agent could choose its own reward, instead of requiring an expert to define it.
An independent classifier is used to evaluate the observation and the output is a label (malicious or benign) defined as reward. After an action a t is executed, the classifier will return a label according to current environment. As our aim is to evade detection and take actions as few as possible, we define reward for each training ''TURN'' based on the label from the classifier and the amount of actions taken. The reward is 0 if the label is ''malicious'', and is calculated using Equation (3) when the label is ''benign''. The trend of this equation is shown in Figure 4 , which means that the smaller the ''TURN'' is, the larger the reward will be. ''MAXTURN'' is defined, which means that the agent should claim failure if ''MAXTURN'' steps of modification have been taken and the reward is still 0. Whenever a positive reward is returned, which means the malicious file evades successfully, the process will end and the agent can learn from it. r t = 20
In this part, this work is inspired by CarRacing-v0 on OpenAI Gym [37] . Reward of it is −0.1 for every frame and +1000/N for every track tile visited, where N is the total number of tiles in track. Thus, the agent can be trained to finish all tiles as fast as possible.
In addition, due to environment is multivariable, it's uncertain whether the same reward can be gotten after the next same action. The more the times are, the more the differences are. Therefore, discount future incentives is necessary. The reward value is calculated by Equation (4) in step t. γ is a discount factor between 0 and 1, and the farther away from now, the less the reward is. It is easy to see that the value of the discounted future rewards in the step t can be expressed in the same way as in the step t + 1.
The discount factor is defined as γ = 0, then the strategy will be too easy, which is based on instant reward. The immediate and future rewards could be kept balanced when the discount factor equals to 0.9. If environment is determined and the same actions always lead to the same reward, then we can define the discount factor as γ = 1. In the context, we tried several values of γ , and finally we summarized that the best γ (see details in section IV-B.4).
F. AGENT
Agent may contain the algorithm itself or simply provide an integration between an algorithm and the environments. It describes the method to run a reinforcement learning algorithm against an environment. In this case, it decides which training path DQEAF to take. The value of different actions in a certain state is valuable. If we know the value of each action, we can choose the most valuable action to perform. We designed a deep convolutional Q-network as an agent, taking efficient actions to modify a malware to evade malware detection. A convolutional network is a class of deep, feedforward artificial neural networks that use a variation of multilayer perceptrons designed to require minimal preprocessing. As the dimension of data goes up, the required resources for training and computation grow exponentially. However, artificial neural network can generalize from the input data and solve the problem of high-dimensional sensory input.
The deep Q-network in DQEAF is an extension of convolutional neural networks, by adding some new features with an action-value Q and a target action-valueQ which map states to action utilities (which is the value of each action according to state or observation) for long-term reward.
Two networks used Q value and Q target separately in computing loss function. The loss function is defined in Equation (5), as shown at the bottom of the next page.
In the context of evading malware detection, network takes the features extracted from the raw binary stream of a malware sample as input, then produces the next malware manipulation the agent will take. As for the output layer of network, it's set to action-index in actions set A. In this context, the output dimension equals 4, which refers to the total dimension of action space.
In more details, the hidden layers, the values of which are not observed in the training set, are designed to 2 layers. The first consists of a convolutional layer with 256 filters using linear activation function, a batch-normalization layer [35] and a rectified linear unit function. The second consists of a convolutional layer with filter number of 64, a batchnormalization layer and a rectified linear unit function. Here, batch normalization is used to improve generalization with choosing Dropout of the network and initiate a large learning rate to speed up the training. What's more, the advantages of rectified linear unit functions are faster convergence in SGD, alleviating the problem of gradient disappearance and a simple implementation. These layers cooperate into a strong network to compute from the input malware features to the output action-index. The network diagram is showed as Figure 5 .
Dropout has been demonstrated to be a very simple and efficient approach for preventing over-fitting in deep neural network. The dropout solution is potentially more resilient to imperfect or dirty data (which is common when extracting features from similar malware that was compiled or packed using different software) [4] . Rectified linear units (ReLU) have been shown to significantly speed up network training over traditional sigmoid activation functions.
G. TRAINING
The training process is illustrated in Training Algorithm (Algorithm 2) integrated with Testing Algorithm (Algorithm 3) to generate models with a higher evasion accuracy.
When it comes to the action-selection policy of the learning, exploration and exploitation policy is considered. Exploration refers to random choice of modifications to explore more possibilities. Exploitation is the choice of the best modification that has been executed to improve the model. Here − greedy policy is used, which practices a random action with a probability and selects the most valuable action with a probability 1 − otherwise. The reflects how much importance is attached to exploratory action policy [5] . The value of decreases during training epochs progress according to Equation (6) . Where n is the current training step and N is the total number of training steps.
Experience replay is used to let reinforcement learning agents remember and reuse experiences from the past. In the process of replay, temporal correlations are broken and transitions are replayed with the same frequency. Our framework is inspired by prioritized experience replay [6] , which takes the priority of transitions into consideration and transitions with high significance can be replayed more frequently. In this work, only the successful modifications of the malware can get high reward and these transitions should have higher priority to be replayed than others.
In each step, transition Experience t = (s t , a t , r t+1 , s t+1 ) (previously mentioned in Equation (1)) will be stored at maximal priority in memory to make sure that each experience will be replayed at least once. As is shown in Training Algorithm 2, after B transitions are stored, the experience replay begins. K transitions from M will be sampled and the for t = 1 to T do 7: With probability using equation (6) select a random action a t or choose a t = arg max a Q(s t , a; θ) using equation (2) 8:
Modify bin t by action a t to bin t+1 and s t+1 = ExtractBinaryFeature(bin t+1 ), observe reward r t+1
9:
Store transition (s t , a t , r t+1 , s t+1 ) using (1) with priority p = max p i
10:
if sizeofM > B then 11: for i = 1 to K do 12: Sample transition X i ∼ P(X i ) = p X i / j p j using equation (7) (j represents each transition in M ) 13: Compute TD-error δ X i using equation (8) 14:
Set loss function Loss X i using equation (5) 16: end for 17: Exert Adam optimizer to optimize parameter θ 18: end if 19: Every U step resetθ = θ 20: if done then 21: break 22: end if 23: end for 24: if episode mod TEST_INTERVAL == 0 then 25: Run Testing Algorithm and get success ratio SR 26: Store Q andQ to a new model m 27: if SR > MAX_RATIO then 28: break 29: end if 30: end if 31: end for probability of sampling transition X i is for t = 1 to T do 6: ComputeQ and choose a t = arg max aQ (s t , a;θ) 7: Alter bin t by action a t to get bin t+1 , s t+1 = ExtractBinaryFeature(bin t+1 ), observe reward r t+1
8:
Add up r t+1 to R
9:
if done then 10: break 11: end if 12: end for 13: end for 14: Compute the value of SR 15: return SR The priority of each transitions will be recalculated after replay. TD error is used to measure the significance of transitions, and it is calculated by Equation (8) . The priority is updated according to TD error, and valuable transitions will get higher priority and are more possible to be replayed.
Optimizer can reduce the loss with discount factor γ to approach the optimum. The unique feature of DQN lies in the future reward from target action-valueQ instead of actionvalue Q. After U turns,Q will be updated to Q. While training, the agent progressively gets close to the optimal action-values through the reward offered by the environment.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
The DQEAF's architecture for evading static PE antimalware engines is implemented based on reinforcement learning, and the experimental results are shown in this section.
A. THE IMPLEMENTATION
DQEAF's environment is defined on the gym toolset, a toolkit for developing and comparing reinforcement learning algorithms, provided by OpenAI. The basic class of environment which named MalwareEnv is extended to fit into the malware detection evasion problem. The environment must define its observation space and action space and have at least two methods: reset and step. • env.reset function will reset the environment to initial state and return the initial observation s 0 .
• env.step will execute a given action, move to the next state, then calculate the detection result of the malware sample in the next state. DQEAF is implemented in Python 3.6. Experiments use the Chainer deep learning library to implement the neural network model. Modification of the PE file uses LIEF [36] toolkit version 0.7.0, which provides a cross platform library to parse, modify and abstract PE formats. The latest version cannot support our framework, because byte stream of PE file cannot be used as input. Each sample's features are extracted by a single thread process. Plotting experimental data uses Visdom library.
B. EXPERIMENT SETUP 1) SAMPLES a: SAMPLE SELECTION
Samples used in this work comes from VirusTotal, which is open source. In the classifier used in this paper, all samples are classified as malicious files. These samples are divided into training set and testing set. In order to reduce the disk IO operation to speed up the training process, all the samples are cached before training, read all the binary data of the sample into memory, and read the observation space directly from the memory during the training process. The number of samples are shown in Table 1 . Four agents are trained based on four families of malicious PE files under the Win32 platform, including ''Backdoor'', ''Trojan'', ''Worm'' and ''Email''.
b: FEATURES NORMALIZATION
In addition to use batch normalization for each layer of the network in agent training, the 513-dimensions observation of each step is normalized to [0.5, −0.5].
c: SAMPLE EFFECTIVENESS
In order to prevent training process interrupted by the failure of the ''rude action'', mentioned in section III-D, each sample is executed in turn to ensure that all actions are effective on all samples. Besides, all samples are classified as malicious software by the target classifier.
2) ACTIONS a: SUCCESSFUL MODIFICATION
To prove that the actions are executed successfully, some tests are done. For each sample, a random sequence of actions is generated and all actions in action space are ensured to be covered. After each step of modification, the binary streams and some features before and after the modification are compared to determine whether the action is executed successfully. The features considered in this work include: length of sections, section name, existence of signature, existence of debug section and imported function.
b: NO CORRUPTION
In order to verify action manipulations will not corrupt the samples' execution, the Cuckoo sandbox [38] is used. Cuckoo runs a submitted sample and analyzes it in a virtual machine. It also reports comprehensive analysis results that outline what the malware does while running inside an isolated operating system, the behavior of a sample including network APIs called, their parameters and so on. The experimental results show that the modified samples can be successfully executed without corruption.
c: FUNCTION PRESERVATION
It is necessary to determine whether variants preserve malicious behavior. IDA Pro is used to disassemble the files to generate function call graphs, flow charts and binary files, and display the import tables and function tables of files. By comparing the function call graphs of all the samples before and after modification respectively, the flow charts have not changed, which can prove that actions do not affect the structure and functions of the files. The flow chart of a sample is showed in Figure 6 .
3) INDEPENDENT CLASSIFIER
This classifier is trained on 50k malicious and 50k benign samples, and extracts features including byte-level data, header, section and import/exports. The model is based on gradient boosted decision tree and trained by Sklearn. To evaluate this classifier, Receiver Operating Characteristic curve (ROC curve) and Area Under the Curve (AUC) are used. ROC is widely used in machine learning and data mining, describing the compromise between Detection Rate (DR) and False Positive Rate (FPR). Besides, ROC curve can keep constant while the distribution of positive and negative samples changes. AUC is a method to calculate DR based on ROC, and the larger the value is, the better the model is. The AUC score of the model is 0.96.
4) PARAMETERS SETTING
In experiments, the independent machine learning classifier to be evaded is a gradient boosted decision tree model trained in 50,000 malicious and 50,000 benign samples. As is shown in training algorithm of section III-G, training rounds terminate early when the agent bypass the detector prior to the T=80 rounds. Each model can be trained for up to D=30,000 rounds, of which the agent is evaluated each TEST_INTERVAL = 1000 steps, and each evaluation is tested on F=200 test samples one by one. After training, if the evaluation mean score is more than MAX_RATIO =7, the training is stopped ahead of time (by this time the success rate has exceeded 70%, and it is proved that the continued training cannot be higher in this work).
What's more, for the DQEAF parameters setup, discount factor γ uses 0.99. Adam algorithm with minibatche of size 32 is used, replay buffer start-size B uses 1000. Agent targetupdate-interval uses 100 and uses ''hard'' update method. Agent also utilizes a ''LinearDecayEpsilonGreedy'' exploration/exploitation strategy, in which mutations are drawn proportionally to their expected Q-value. The behavior policy during training was −greedy with annealed linearly from 1 to 0.1 over the first 1000 steps, and fixed at 0.1 thereafter. The major parameter settings in the training algorithm are shown in Table 2 .
C. RESULT
In supervised learning, one can easily track the performance of a model during training by evaluating it on the training and validation sets. In reinforcement learning, however, accurately evaluating the progress of an agent during training can be challenging [24] .
The result of the model is trained on ''Backdoor'' files. Other models are trained and evaluated in the same way.
Statistical metric of model evaluation steps in the training process are recorded periodically. In Table 3 , the indicators include metric of the average total reward value, the policy's estimating action-value function Q, which provides an estimate of how much discounted reward the agent can obtain by following its policy from any given state, and the average value of the loss. As shown in the table, the model goes into a stage when training for about 23,019 steps, the SR is up to 7.5.
The agent's improvement after training can be seen below. The average total reward plot in Figure 7 tends to be very noisy because small changes to the weights of a policy can lead to large changes in the training path. The plot in Figure 9 shows loss value dropped to a very small value after 20,000 steps of training. The trend of the change of average predicted Q in Figure 8 is much more smoothly than the average total reward in Figure 7 . Testing method is the same as that evaluation approach during the training process. Two methods are used to test the 200 testing samples. In particular, for each of the 200 malware samples, the trained agent by DQEAF to manipulate the samples (up to MAXTURN = 80 times), and test whether any sequence of actions can result in a successful evasion.
This agent achieves general expectation of robustness. This work also evaluates the effectiveness of proposed methods on other quantities of ''Backdoor'' files, and this method achieves general expectation of robustness. The evasion success rate of 2000 samples can still reach 70% in the test process. Evasion rate on other quantities of test samples is shown in Table 4 . The efficacy of models trained on other families of PE malware are shown in Table 5 .
Cross-validation is used to evaluate the robustness of each model. The models trained on one family samples are used to test other family samples. The result is in Table 6 .
The work of Anderson et al. [7] , [34] in adversarial machine learning has shown that deep learning models are susceptible to attacks and evasions. They present a general algorithm named Gym-Malware to attack the PE malware classifier by generating adversarial malware examples. As their open source implementations are available and their method only requires black-box access to the classifier, we made a comparison between the proposed DQEAF and their algorithm.
Their framework is used to train these four families samples aforementioned in Table 1 . The comparative experimental results are shown in Table 7 . These two models trained on the same training set against the same classifier.
Our framework shows more advantages and the evasion success rate of adversarial examples in each families from DQEAF are higher than that from Gym-Malware. Priority is taken into consideration during the replay of the past transitions, thus transitions with higher value can be replayed more frequently and the reinforcement learning network is optimized. Low dimensions observation is used to reduce the instability raised by high dimensions, and the convergence speed of network training is increased.
Successful evasion samples of ''Backdoor'' produced by DQEAF are uploaded to Virustotal, and found that the average detection ratio was 28 / 66, down from 54 / 66.
The focus of this paper is static Windows PE malware, and furthermore it can be extended to other sorts of malware. The training process does not extract any feature value based on the PE file structure features, but is based on the characteristics of binary byte stream. So this evasion method can also be applied to other platforms such as ELF, Android.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper proposed a framework named DQEAF using reinforcement learning to evade anti-malware engines. The core component of DQEAF is an AI agent, which is constantly interacting with malware samples. The agent could choose optimal sequences of functionality-preserving actions deliberately by deep reinforcement learning, which aims to evade the supervised detector. Experiments show that the proposed DQEAF has a high success rate in PE samples. In the future work, we will consider other platforms with different file structures and try to explore the defense of the attacks.
APPENDIX A LOG OF TRAINING ACTIONS SELECTION
We logged the selection of actions in training process for each sample. Details about the sequence of actions for samples that have been modified successfully can be seen in Table 8 
